Mr. President, early last Friday morning, the Senate

acted on the President's request to grant him authority to use force in

Iraq. I joined with a majority of my colleagues from both sides of the

aisle to support the resolution granting that authority, but made clear

then and continue to believe now that our vote was the first step in

our effort to address the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass

destruction. In my statement before that vote, I indicated the

President faces several challenges as he attempts to fashion a policy

that will be successful in our efforts against Saddam Hussein and his

weapons of mass destruction.

One of those challenges is preparing for what might happen in Iraq

after Saddam Hussein and preparing the American people for what might

be required of us on this score. To that end, I was interested to see

an article in Friday morning's newspaper with the title, ``U.S. Has a

Plan to Occupy Iraq, Officials Report.''

Citing unnamed administration officials, the article contends the

administration is modeling plans for the economic and political

reconstruction of Iraq on the successful efforts in post-WWII Japan.

The article goes on to report that the Administration has yet to

endorse a final position and this issue had not been discussed with key

American allies. When questioned at a press conference Friday

afternoon, the White House spokesperson distanced himself from this

specific plan.

If this news account is true, I have no choice but to conclude this

administration has much to do before it will be in position to present

a plan to the American people and the world about what

it feels is necessary to promote economic and political stability in

post-conflict Iraq. We do know, however, that a plan based on the Japan

precedent would require a significant and lengthy commitment of

American political will, economic resources, and military might.

While I do not doubt either our resolve or capability to be

successful in Iraq, it is critical that the Administration be clear

with the Congress, the American people, and the world about what it

believes will be needed in post-Saddam Iraq, what portion of that it

believes America should undertake, and what it believes others should

be prepared to do. To this end, I urge the President and his

administration to keep in mind the following facts and questions as

planning for post-conflict Iraq continues.

General MacArthur and President Truman made a strategic choice in

post-WWII Japan to leave intact as much as 95 percent of the imperial

Japanese government, including the Emperor himself, because of the fear

of what impact a massive upheaval of the government structure would

have on stability in Japan. Do the President and his team intend to

follow that precedent, or we will start from scratch in constructing

post-conflict institutions in Iraq?

We maintained nearly 80,000 troops in Japan for 6 years after V-J Day

and still maintain 47,000 troops to this day, more than a half century

after the conflict officially ended. How long does the administration

anticipate having U.S. forces in post-conflict Iraq, and how much of

this burden can we anticipate our friends allies will assume?

Post-WWII Japan represented an ethnically and religiously homogenous

population. How does the fact that Iraq is riven by ethnic and

religious difference impact U.S. planning for post-conflict Iraq?

From 1946 to 1950, the Congressional Research Service estimates that

the United States spent a yearly average of $3 billion, in today's

dollars, for the occupation of Japan. Are those the kinds of numbers

the President and his team anticipate for political and economic

reconstruction in post-conflict Iraq?

If the administration plans on obtaining assistance from others, what

nations is it assuming will be willing to help us? What is the

administration assuming these other nations are prepared to do and for

how long? If no plan is yet in place and no allies briefed, when does

the administration believe such discussions should begin?

I ask unanimous consent to print the article in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in

the Record, as follows: